The Distributive Preferences of Green Voters in Times of Electoral Realignment

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Abstract

Based on the material self-interest and the ideological predisposition of green voters, we argue and demonstrate that they are economically left but that they have distinct social policy preferences from voters of the old left. The results show that green voters are strongly committed to the welfare state but favour different social policies and welfare state reforms than social democrats. They are more likely to support social investment than social consumption and endorse a universal and unconditional access to social benefits. Our results imply that the realignment within the left may have important implications for the welfare state.

Introduction

More than ever, welfare states are under pressure to adapt to new economic and social realities. The reform directions that welfare states consequently take are strongly dependent on coalition dynamics, both on the micro- and the macro-level of decision making (Häusermann, 2010; Garritzmann et al., 2019). These coalition dynamics are in flux too as party systems grow more fragmented and traditional centre-left and centre-right governments, so decisive for distributive policy-making in the past, are less likely win to electoral majorities (Manow et al., 2018). The mounting electoral popularity of green parties, often at the expense of traditional center-left parties, is one of the contributing factors to this new party constellation. The relevance of the partisan composition of the government for "conventional" distributive policies (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001; van Kersbergen and Manow 2009) as well as for the social investment turn (Huber and Stephens 2006; Bonoli 2013) is one of the core insights of the comparative welfare state literature. However, we know surprisingly little about the implication of green parties' mounting electoral popularity for distributive politics. Our study tackles this question from the demand-side. As parties shape policies in the interest of their voters, we consider it crucial to investigate the social policy preferences of green voters and to compare them with the voters of the social democratic left.

Our analysis goes beyond general welfare state support. We develop an argument about green voters' welfare state preferences on two dimensions which shape the politics of the welfare state in the 21$^{\text{st}}$ century. First, in line with Hemerijck (2017) and Beramendi et al. (2015), we consider the positions of green voters on passive consumption versus active investment policies. This debate focuses on the *goals* of social policies. Second, we consider emerging debates about who gets *access* to the entitlements and benefits that the welfare state provides. To this end, we consider preferences towards three possible welfare state reforms, namely a welfare chauvinistic vision of the welfare state that grants protection and security mainly to the native population, the idea of a European welfare state where protection is equalized across Europe, and a basic universal income (UBI) that de-links welfare state benefits from employment. There is increasing work explaining support for these different policies, but they have not been studied from an explicit partisan perspective.

Based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) for twelve European countries, we first confirm the general notion that green voters are indeed voters of the economic left. We then examine their support for specific social policies, contrasting their welfare state preferences with those of social democratic and other left voters. Our analyses reveal a complex pattern of social policy preferences: Green voters are

more likely to favour social investment and to take a universalistic position about access to the welfare state than social democrats. This suggests that the realignment within the left may impact the future re-calibration processes of the welfare state in advanced economies.

The article proceeds as follows. We first develop our arguments about the attitudes of green voters compared to social democrats towards the multi-dimensional welfare state debates. In the empirical section, we then explain our data and methods before we discuss the empirical results in detail. The concluding section discusses the implications of our argument and outlines further avenues for research.

Theoretical framework

The rise of a new left party: Consequences for welfare politics

Why would we expect green voters to be economically left-leaning? In the following, we outline our argument about the distributive preferences of green voters. As children of the new social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, green parties value the individual liberty to choose an autonomous lifestyle. They advocate women's emancipation and gay liberation, decentralized modes of political decision-making as well as pacifism and multiculturalism (Kitschelt, 1989; Poguntke, 1993). Yet, green parties are also left-wing in economic terms. Welfare state issues are clearly important for the ideological appeal of green parties, and increasingly so. Since 2010, green parties have emphasised distributive issues in their electoral platforms more than, for example, social democratic or liberal parties (Röth and Schwander, 2020).

The political sociology of green voters suggests that their voters are left-wing too. The core voters of green parties are the young, urban professionals, i.e., the "new" middle class, known to support the "new left" (Kriesi, 1998; Kitschelt, 1994). Green voters are comparatively younger (Dolezal, 2010; Bochsler and Sciarini, 2010) and better educated than other voters (e.g., Knutsen, 2004). Green parties also enjoy higher support among women (Dolezal, 2010; Knutsen, 2004) and middle-class employees than other parties (Müller-Rommel, 2002), and they prosper in cities (Close and Delwit, 2016). These are the winners of the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial, knowledge-based service economy. They fill the new service (and often public-sector) jobs that demand specialized expertise and knowledge (Kriesi, 1998). Their jobs are based on an interpersonal work logic that focuses on attending to their clients' needs (Oesch, 2006). They are dealing on a daily basis with human individuality and diversity and enjoy a substantial amount of autonomy in their work. A

working environment shaped by such a work logic reinforces preferences for social reciprocity and individual creativeness over monetary earnings (Kitschelt, 1994, p. 16) as well as solidarity with weaker members of the society (Oesch, 2006). The new middle class is thus situated on the left side of the political spectrum, endorsing redistribution and a strong welfare state (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014).

In this sense, green voters are similar to social democratic voters. In response to the structural changes outlined above, centre-left parties updated their ideological offer and attracted voters from the new middle class too (Kitschelt, 1994; Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015). Yet, these parties still appeal to a coalition of working- and middle-class voters (Rennwald and Pontusson, 2020), two groups that are united by their general support for the welfare state and state intervention. Hence, the difference in welfare state preferences between green voters, and social democratic voters does not lie in their general support for the welfare state, as stated by our first hypothesis:

> H1: *Green voters hold as left-leaning, state-interventionist economic preferences as social democratic voters.*

The multidimensional social policy preferences of Green voters

Rather, and building on the literature on the multi-dimensionality of welfare state conflicts, we take a differentiated view on welfare state politics. We focus on two central dimensions of welfare state conflicts that structure distributive politics of the 21st century. One of the most important lines of conflict within distributive politics relates to the *goals* of the welfare state: What should be the overarching function of social policies? Another line of conflict concerns *access* to welfare state benefits: Who should be entitled to welfare state benefits and on which criteria is that access granted? We study the preferences of green voters on both of these dimensions separately.

Goals of the welfare state: Social consumption versus social investment

Should the welfare state protect citizens ex-post in the case of adverse shocks or should it help to prepare them ex-ante for a changing economic environment by investing in their human capital? Traditionally, the welfare state was designed to protect citizens ex-post in the case of adverse events such as loss of employment, old age, or disability (Beramendi et al., 2015). This is the *social consumption* aspect of the welfare state. Alternatively, the welfare state can help its citizens to prepare for a changing economic environment by investing in their human capital and capabilities (Morel et al., 2012).

These *social investment* policies, in particular childcare and early childhood education, children- and women-oriented family policies, or active labour market policies, prioritize long-term returns over short-term benefits and can be defined as policies centred on the creation, preservation, and mobilisation of human skills (Garritzmann et al., 2019).

We study the the attitudes of green voters in comparison to social democratic voters on both of these two goals of the welfare state, and we argue that green voters are particularly supportive of social investment policies (for the socio-structural determinants of support for social investment policies, see e.g., Bonoli and Häusermann, 2009; Garritzmann et al., 2018). Concretely, we base our expectations on two lines of arguments: material self-interest and ideology of green voters.[1] First, social investment squares well with the material self-interest of green voters. In Western Europe, social investment policies especially benefit the extended middle class that uses educational and childcare facilities over-proportionally, an effect known as the "Matthew-effect of social investment" (Bonoli et al., 2017). Based on their socio-structural endowment, green voters should therefore support social investment from a rational choice perspective.

Second, social investment also aligns with the egalitarian ideology of green voters. Normative ideas about obligation and responsibility guide attitudes and preferences of voters towards the welfare state as well, not interests alone. In a "moral economy" of welfare states individuals evaluate the welfare state institutions according to moral assumptions and considerations of social justice rather than considering how social policy benefits them (Mau, 2003). Social investment promotes the idea of equality of opportunities while providing minimum buffers for the weakest members of the society (Hemerijck, 2018). This squares well with the solidarity that the new middle class feels towards those weaker members of the society (Oesch, 2006). They are more likely to have universalistic and egalitarian attitudes (Kitschelt, 1994) and thus support policies with uncertain distributive benefits.

These attitudes also pit green voters against voters of the old left. The preferences of the social democratic electorate are likely to be more heterogeneous than those of the green electorate as it consists of a coalition of working-class and middle-class voters (Kitschelt, 1994; Rennwald and Pontusson, 2020). Traditional social democratic voters should be less inclined towards social investment and prioritize traditional forms of social protection. The growing relevance of educated middle-class voters goes hand in hand with a stronger emphasizes on social investment policies from social democratic parties at the expense of social compensation (Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015; Abou-

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[1]Both lines of arguments have been shown to be important drivers of social policy preferences (e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Linos and West, 2003; van Oorschot, 2006).

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Chadi and Wagner, 2019), which corresponds to the interest of their new electorate. Yet, evidence shows that this risks alienating working-class supporters (Karreth et al., 2013; Schwander and Manow, 2016). This is in contrast to green parties, which do not have a working-class background. On average, we thus expect green voters to be more supportive of social investment than social democratic voters. Hence, our second hypothesis states:

> H2a: *Green voters are more likely to support social investment than social democratic voters.*

Regarding preferences on social consumption, material self-interest and ideological predispositions pull green voters in opposite directions. Given their socio-structural characteristics, green voters are less likely to benefit personally from social compensation and should, therefore, not support social consumption spending. For instance, green voters are less likely to rely on compensatory social policy since they are less likely to become unemployed (see Schwander (2019) for an analysis of unemployment risks among the educated middle class). Ideologically, by contrast, green voters should be inclined to support social consumption due to their egalitarian values. For the average social democratic voter, ideology and self-interest are more likely to pull in the same direction: Social consumption is (more) attractive for material reasons for social democrats than for green voters, but the former also support it for ideological reasons. Given that green voters are torn in different directions by self-interest and ideological predispositions, we assume that self-interest should dominate. Existing policies create constituencies, which defend their own interest. Hence, we expect:

> H2b: *Green voters are less likely to support social consumption than social democratic voters.*
> H2c: *Green voters are more likely to sacrifice social consumption for social investment than social democratic voters.*

Access to the welfare state: Universalism versus particularism

A second line of conflict in welfare politics concerns the access to the entitlements and benefits that the welfare state provides. Immigration and economic insecurity trigger debates about the limits of welfare states solidarity that might cut across the traditional left-right division of European societies. We expect green voters to have a more universalistic position than social democrats regarding access to the welfare state. Green parties emerged out of the new social movements which rallied around

the protection of the environment, the emancipation of women, human rights, and peace. The brand of green parties was built on universalism. Applied to social policy attitudes, we, therefore, argue that green voters should support broad access to the welfare state, and they do this more strongly than voters of the old left. Specifically, we expect this underlying preference structure to crystallize around three policies that all tap into the question about access to the welfare state: welfare chauvinism, European social policies, and universal basic income.

First, we expect green voters to oppose a chauvinistic welfare state. Citizens with welfare chauvinistic attitudes demand that jobs and income protection should be given primarily – or exclusively – to native citizens (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990, p. 212). This links left-leaning economic attitudes with right-leaning socio-cultural views on deservingness, identity, and borders of solidarity (van Oorschot, 2006). Eger and Breznau (2017) demonstrate that the relationship between socio-structural characteristics and welfare chauvinism seems to relate more to general attitudes towards migrants than to welfare state support. From this perspective, it seems clear that welfare chauvinism clashes with the ideology of green voters. Located on the opposite pole on the ideological distribution to the radical populist right in Europe's two-dimensional space (Bornschier, 2010a), green parties are supported by citizens with pro-immigration attitudes. Green voters are both higher educated and more likely to live in urban areas than voters of the old left. Both factors are negatively related to support for migration and welfare state chauvinism (e.g., Eger and Breznau, 2017; Heizmann et al., 2018). As green voters are usually not in direct competition for jobs or welfare resources with migrants, material self-interest also predicts a lower support of green voters for welfare chauvinism. Hence, ideology and self-interest would both suggest that green voters do not embrace welfare chauvinistic attitudes, while the lower education level of many social democratic voters makes this less evident. Consequently, we hypothesize that:

> H3a: *Green voters are less likely to embrace a chauvinistic welfare state vision than social democratic voters.*

A second debate about the boundaries of solidarity revolves around the question of transnational solidarity within the European Union (EU). The debate about a European social insurance scheme and minimum benefit scheme re-ignited in the wake of the Great Recession and the refugee crisis of 2015. Despite a clear geographical variation in support (Vasilopoulou and Talving, 2019), a considerable share of the European populations support some forms of pan-European solidarity (Ferrera and Pellegata, 2018). On the individual-level, Bremer et al. (2020) find that radical populist right voters are less likely to support European solidarity due to their strong

national identity. In contrast, we expect green voters to be ideologically predisposed to support European-wide social policies (even more than social democratic voters) as green voters are generally cosmopolitans, who favour European integration (Bornschier, 2010b; Dolezal, 2010). In terms of self-interest, green voters would be unlikely to benefit from a European social protection scheme due to their relatively high level of education and skills. Yet, given that the distributive effects of such a scheme are still uncertain, we assume that value dispositions are more important for preference formation than material interests in this case. Hence, we expect the following:

> H3b: *Green voters are more likely to support a European social protection scheme than social democratic voters*

A third discussion evolves around the introduction of a universal basic income (UBI). The UBS is designed to be unrelated to previous contributions, hence granting access to everyone, also non-native citizens.[2] Research on the individual-level determinants of support for UBI (Parolin and Siöland, 2020; Roosma and von Oorschot, 2020; Baute and Meuleman, 2020) shows that low income, low education, and unemployment risks increase support for UBI. An important motivation of support for UBI might hence lie in opposition to more punitive forms of activation that sanction unemployed individuals for refusing a job offer. Consequently, from a perspective of self-interest, social democratic voters should be more likely to support UBI than green voters due to their opposition to activation. Yet, from an ideological perspective, green voters may be more supportive of UBI. Highly educated individuals value the freedom and protection that UBI would guarantee them, especially high-skilled outsiders (Häusermann et al., 2015). Moreover, green voters tend to be more skeptical about economic growth and ever-growing productivity as the sole sources of economic progress (Wavreille and Pilet, 2016). UBI should appeal to them because of its universal character and because it represents an "expressive" deployment of social policy, allowing for human self-realization. This might lead green votes to endorse UBI as a way out of the productivity race. As before, we thus expect ideology to trump self-interest:

> H3c: *Green voters are more likely to support a UBI than social democratic voters.*

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[2]In addition, a UBI is also unconditional in four additional ways. It is paid in cash; it is individual, i.e., independent of the beneficiaries' household situation; it is universal, i.e., entitlement is unconditionally from other income regardless of the sources of income and it is duty-free, i.e., no condition of willingness to work are attached (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017, p. 14).

Data and methods

We test our expectations with data from the 8th round of the ESS (2016). The ESS has the advantage of providing detailed information on voters' welfare state preferences, information that is crucial to examine the article's arguments. We include all Western European countries where green parties won more than two percent of the vote share in the national parliamentary election prior to the survey.[3] Since we are interested in preferences of green voters, we restrict our analysis to eligible voters in the respective countries.

In a first analytical step, we assess whether green voters are indeed voters of the economic left. We generate two variables that measure the general left-leaning disposition of voters' economic attitudes: the *left-right self-placement* of individuals as well as attitudes towards *redistribution*. The former is a general measure for ideology, which encapsulates a range of different dimensions (Caughety et al., 2019); the latter measures whether respondents are left-wing in a narrower, economic sense. Second, we measure individuals' preferences for social investment and social consumption with three variables. The first two variables measure support for *consumption* (acceptance of the government's responsibility to provide for the old) and *investment* (acceptance of the government's responsibility to assist working parents) in an unconstrained setting. The third variable measures support for social investment at the expense of social consumption, i.e., it suggest a trade-off. It asks whether respondents agree with higher spending on training or education for the unemployed at the expense of spending for passive unemployment benefits. As indicators for preferences for access to the welfare state, we measure *welfare chauvinistic attitudes*, support for a *European minimum income scheme* as well as support for an *unconditional basic income*. Appendix A lists the exact wording of our dependent variables, while Appendix B shows the summary statistics of all key variables.

Our central explanatory variable of interest is *party choice*. It is a categorical variable that distinguishes green voters (the reference category) from voters of social democratic, far-left, and other (that is right-wing) parties based on the party family classification provided by ParlGov (Döring and Manow, 2019). The share of green voters included in the survey in each country makes up approximately nine percent of our sample in the countries considered, which is comparable to that of other small parties, as shown in Appendix B. Moreover, it is similar to the average vote share

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[3]These countries include Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.

that green parties received in the parliamentary elections in the countries included in the analysis.[4]

We use logistic regression analysis to test our expectations. We treat all dependent variables as ordinal categorical variables and compute two sets of ordered logit regression models. First, we calculate models which include only party choice as independent variable in order to estimate the average differences between supporters of different party families. Second, we compute more complex model specifications which include a set of standard control variables such as age, gender, education, income as well as a number of dummy variables that indicate whether individuals have children, live in an urban area, are a trade union member or work in the public sector. This second set of regression models tests whether differences between supporters of different parties persist if we account for common socio-demographic explanations of social policy preferences.[5] All models include country-fixed effects and country-clustered standard errors.

We present the main results via regression tables below. Appendix C plots the distributions of support between the different voter groups and Appendix D shows predicted probabilities plots for the main results based on the regression analyses. To test the robustness of our results, we estimated other model specifications: we treated the dependent variables as binary and calculate binary logit regressions; where appropriate, we also treated the dependent variables as continuous and estimated OLS regressions with fixed effects, we re-calculated all regression models without clustered standard errors. Moreover, we controlled for country differences (see Appendix F by using jackknife regressions, excluding one country at a time from the analysis, and by calculating hierarchical models with random effect where individuals are clustered in countries. In general, these robustness tests did not substantially change the results shown below.

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[4]For an analysis of a more detailed party choice variable that further distinguishes between right-wing parties, please see Appendix E.

[5]In the main analysis below, we include parsimonious models which include age and education as linear variables. In Appendix G, we replicate the analysis and also control for socio-cultural attitudes that are commonly associated with support for green parties, namely support for gay rights and immigration, respectively.

Empirical results

How left-wing are green voters?

First, we want to establish that green voters are left-wing voters when it comes to distributive politics, that is voters with a "state-interventionist disposition" (Kitschelt, 1989). Table 1 shows the results from two logit regression analyses with an individual's left-right placement (model 1 and 3) and their attitudes towards redistribution (model 2 and 4) as dependent variables. Model 1 shows that green voters are less likely to consider themselves right-wing than other (that is, right-wing) voters but that there are no statistically significant differences between green voters and other left-wing voters. Model 2 suggests that green voters are more likely to support redistribution than other voters except far-left voters. Again, and as expected, differences between social democratic and green voters are statistically not significant. This is confirmed by results from model 3 and 4 which control for other variables including age, gender, education, etc. As suggested by Hypothesis 1, the results imply that green voters consider themselves left-wing and generally support state-interventionist economic policies, much like voters of social democratic parties.

Welfare state goals: social consumption versus social investment

In the next step, we explore the multi-dimensionality of welfare state conflicts in the 21st century and examine the attitudes of green voters on the consumption/investment dimension. In Table 2, the first two variables measure support for consumption and investment in unconstrained scenarios, respectively. The third variable measures support for social investment at the expense of consumption.

The results indicate that green voters' social policy attitudes are not only different from those of non-left voters, but also those of voters of the old left. First, green voters are less likely to support social consumption than social democrats. According to model 1, the odds of strongly supporting social consumption (versus all other categories) is 1.15 times higher for social democrats than green voters.[6] However, this difference is no longer statistically significant when other variables are included as control variables (model 4). For social consumption, ideology and interest seem to pull green voters into opposite direction, as argued in hypothesis 2b.

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[6] All odds ratios expressed are proportional odds ratios. Tests for the proportional odds or the parallel regression assumption indicate that the assumption is not violated in any instance.

Table 1: Differences in economic attitudes among left-wing voters (ordered logit regressions)

	(1) left-right	(2) redistribution	(3) left-right	(4) redistribution
party choice (ref.: greens)				
. other	2.429***	−0.791***	2.295***	−0.849***
	(15.37)	(−7.81)	(16.20)	(−5.98)
. radical left	−0.467	0.591**	−0.503	0.434
	(−1.07)	(2.82)	(−1.23)	(1.89)
. social democrats	0.298	−0.0432	0.270	−0.121
	(1.81)	(−0.85)	(1.71)	(−1.49)
age			0.00390	0.0112**
			(1.54)	(3.23)
female (1 = yes)			−0.280***	0.207***
			(−7.94)	(4.34)
education			−0.109**	−0.0819***
			(−2.77)	(−3.40)
income			0.0561***	−0.122***
			(3.60)	(−13.54)
children (1 = yes)			0.0781	0.0202
			(1.49)	(0.64)
urban area (1 = yes)			−0.0940	0.00127
			(−1.50)	(0.02)
unemployed (1 = yes)			−0.158	0.215
			(−1.45)	(1.87)
union member (1 = yes)			−0.184**	0.312***
			(−3.28)	(6.09)
public sector (1 = yes)			−0.212***	0.159***
			(−5.79)	(4.38)
Observations	15493	15878	8430	8589
AIC	60190.5	41183.8	32200.7	22075.7
BIC	60274.7	41229.8	32278.2	22153.4

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table 2: Differences in support for social consumption and investment among left-wing voters (ordered logit regressions)

	(1) consumption	(2) investment	(3) trade-off	(4) consumption	(5) investment	(6) trade-off
party choice (ref.: greens)						
. other	−0.144∗	−0.469∗∗∗	0.210∗∗∗	−0.193∗∗∗	−0.516∗∗∗	0.167∗∗
	(−2.04)	(−7.95)	(4.27)	(−3.38)	(−6.57)	(2.96)
. radical left	0.426∗∗∗	−0.0215	−0.144	0.320∗∗∗	−0.0840	−0.118
	(5.58)	(−0.15)	(−1.40)	(4.89)	(−0.54)	(−1.51)
. social democrats	0.135∗	−0.163∗∗∗	−0.0582	0.0490	−0.242∗∗∗	−0.0527
	(1.98)	(−3.44)	(−0.93)	(0.64)	(−4.02)	(−0.62)
age				−0.00186	−0.00605∗	−0.0111∗∗∗
				(−0.85)	(−2.40)	(−4.50)
female (1 = yes)				0.163∗	0.00214	−0.0435
				(2.50)	(0.05)	(−0.80)
education				−0.143∗∗∗	0.0197	−0.00558
				(−7.38)	(0.57)	(−0.16)
income				−0.0558∗∗∗	−0.00709	0.0560∗∗∗
				(−4.65)	(−0.47)	(4.76)
children (1 = yes)				0.0418	0.178∗∗∗	0.0409
				(1.00)	(4.19)	(0.91)
urban area (1 = yes)				−0.0191	0.0537	0.0105
				(−0.33)	(0.91)	(0.35)
unemployed (1 = yes)				−0.120	0.0838	−0.455∗∗∗
				(−1.21)	(0.61)	(−3.99)
union member (1 = yes)				0.170∗∗∗	0.134∗	−0.0593
				(3.63)	(2.34)	(−0.90)
public sector (1 = yes)				0.0247	0.103	0.0597
				(0.42)	(1.40)	(1.11)
Observations	15954	15326	15443	8615	8364	8425
AIC	57080.4	32514.8	32198.4	30216.6	17653.4	17143.5
BIC	57164.9	32553.0	32236.7	30294.3	17730.7	17220.9

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

By contrast, model 2 and 5 both suggest that green voters have a higher propensity to support social investment than social democratic voters. For social democratic voters, the odds of strongly supporting support investment (versus all other categories) is 0.84 times lower than for green voters (model 2). This difference persist when all other variables are held constant in model 5. According to our results, compared to the voters of all other party families (see Appendix E), green voters are actually the group that is most supportive of social investment. This can be explained from both a rational choice and an ideological perspective: social investment often benefits young and female individual, and hence, green voters rely on it more than social democratic voters. At the same time, social investment appeals to green voters for ideological reasons, as explained above.

Yet, Table 4 also shows that the support for social investment among green voters is not unconditional. Contrary to hypothesis 2c, green voters are not more likely to support social investment than social democratic voters when there is a trade-off between spending on social consumption and social investment (model 3 and 6). Right-wing voters are more willing to sacrifice consumption for higher investment than social democrats but this is not the cast for green voters. As results in Appendix E show, voters of conservative and Christian democratic parties are most likely to accept this trade-off. In recent years, these parties have advocated for a more investment-oriented welfare state, particularly in the realm of family policy (Morgan, 2013). Their voters seem to support this recalibration. Overall, the results suggest that green voters support an investment-oriented welfare state but not necessarily at the expense of social consumption.

Access to the welfare state: Universalism versus particularism

As the final step in our analysis, Table 3 displays the results from regression models that explore attitudes towards welfare state access. Models 1 and 4 confirm that green voters are much less likely to hold welfare state chauvinistic attitudes than social democratic voters (Hypothesis 3a). Even when controlling for all other variables (model 4), the odds that social democratic voters have strongly chauvinistic attitudes (versus chauvinistic attitudes or no chauvinistic attitudes) are 1.35 times higher than green voters (but still less likely than voters of the right). Green voters thus have a broad notion of solidarity that includes non-native citizens. They are the least likely group to embrace welfare state chauvinism, although there is no statistically significant difference between green and far-left voters.

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Table 3: Differences in support for universalism vs. particularism among left-wing voters (ordered logit regressions)

	(1) w.s. chauvinism	(2) eu social protection	(3) basic income	(4) w.s. chauvinism	(5) eu social protection	(6) basic income
party choice (ref.: greens)						
. other	0.940***	−0.905***	−0.920***	0.787***	−0.866***	−0.841***
	(8.79)	(−11.22)	(−11.75)	(11.90)	(−9.21)	(−7.35)
. radical left	0.343	−0.251	−0.117	0.144	−0.273	−0.166
	(1.83)	(−1.39)	(−0.54)	(0.69)	(−1.09)	(−0.66)
. social democrats	0.507***	−0.323**	−0.516***	0.304**	−0.355*	−0.489***
	(4.30)	(−2.88)	(−6.74)	(3.26)	(−2.51)	(−5.00)
age				0.00442	0.00222	−0.00505*
				(1.29)	(0.54)	(−2.13)
female (1 = yes)				−0.124**	0.116**	−0.0431
				(−2.83)	(2.61)	(−0.89)
education				−0.143***	0.00726	0.0553
				(−5.41)	(0.17)	(1.87)
income				0.00325	−0.0295	−0.0631***
				(0.42)	(−1.36)	(−4.09)
children (1 = yes)				0.0916**	−0.0851*	−0.0776**
				(2.79)	(−2.00)	(−2.93)
urban area (1 = yes)				−0.234***	0.0385	0.126**
				(−3.75)	(0.57)	(2.60)
unemployed (1 = yes)				−0.0295	0.338*	0.253
				(−0.36)	(2.19)	(1.90)
union member (1 = yes)				−0.0184	0.116*	0.0558
				(−0.30)	(2.39)	(0.83)
public sector (1 = yes)				−0.0126	0.209**	0.120*
				(−0.21)	(2.96)	(2.30)
Observations	14840	12862	15294	8070	6835	8389
AIC	35093.1	28604.3	35950.3	19369.5	15201.3	19747.3
BIC	35131.1	28641.7	35988.5	19446.4	15256.0	19824.7

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Green voters also hold distinct attitudes towards a European welfare state. Models 2 and 5 clearly show that green voters are much more supportive of a European social protection scheme than right-wing voters but they also reveal substantive differences between voters of the old and new left. As visualised in Appendix D, green voters have a predicted probability of 0.71 to either support or strongly support such a scheme which is higher than any other partisan group. Even though most of our respondents are from continental or Nordic welfare states, which would likely be net contributors to such a scheme, green voters are enthusiastic about it, and clearly more so than social democratic voters. Based on model 5, the odds that social democratic voters strongly support such a scheme (versus support, oppose, or strongly oppose) are 0.70 times lower than green voters, holding all other variables constant. This confirms our expectations that green voters support a universalistic notion of welfare state access. They have cosmopolitan attitudes and are ideologically more predisposed to supporting European integration than voters of the old left, even if they would not directly benefit from such a scheme.

Lastly, green voters are more likely to support the implementation of UBI (Hypothesis 3c). Models 3 and 6 of Table 3 indicate that green voters are the most supportive constituency for UBI. In part, this reflects an ambiguity towards basic income among the "old left", which is strongly tied to the notion of work (Van Parijs, 2018), but it also reflects an openness towards new economic models and social policies among green voters. According to proponents of UBI, such a policy would increase the freedom of individuals to choose how they partake in the knowledge economy (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017), which resonates well with green voters. It is therefore not surprising that green parties were among the first actors to voice support for the UBI: In the late 1970s, the newly-founded British Ecology Party was the first European political agent to include basic income in its program. In this article, we are not able to delve deeper in the motivation of green voters to support a UBI, but given that proponents of UBI consider the UBI to be a policy for the "precariat" (Standing, 2011), we suggest that their support is based on ideology.

Conclusion

In conclusion, our findings show that green voters are voters of the left, not just culturally but also economically. Yet, taking into account the multi-dimensionality of distributive conflicts in the 21st century, our analyses show that the specific social policy preferences of green voters diverge from those of the old left: they are more likely to endorse social investment than social consumption. At the same time, green

voters exhibit different attitudes regarding welfare state access and entitlement than the voters of the old left: they are more likely to support universal access to the welfare state, which is evident from their opposition to welfare state chauvinism as well as their support for European social solidarity and UBI. But there is also common ground: Green voters are as unwilling to sacrifice consumption over investment as social democrats.

The implications of these findings are two-fold. On the one hand, our analyses suggest that the realignment within the left has important implications for the re-calibration of the welfare state. Welfare states are constantly under pressure to adapt to new economic and social realities and the reform directions that they take are strongly dependent on coalition dynamics, both on the micro- and the macro-level of decision making (Häusermann, 2010; Garritzmann et al., 2019). Green voters support the welfare state and have very similar preferences towards redistribution as the old left. Electoral realignment in West European party systems, therefore, does not imply the end of the welfare state. Yet, their welfare state preferences are different from those of old left voters, and green parties are likely to push for further recalibration of the welfare state as they gain electoral support and join governments. Furthermore, our study adds to the literature on electoral realignment processes by highlighting the possible implications of this realignment for welfare politics.

Understanding the influence of green parties on welfare state politics is, in our view, also crucial because green parties stand at the forefront of the conflict that shapes contemporaneous politics: the cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation and social modernisation (Kriesi et al., 2008; Bornschier, 2010b). If green parties represent the winners of structural changes, right-wing populist parties represent the other pole of this conflict, representing voters who resist cultural change. With the growing relevance of the globalisation cleavage, these two party families gain increasing electoral support, but the effect of this realignment on distributive politics has not gained much academic attention (for an exception see Röth and Schwander, 2020). As the "new" left is gaining at the expense of the "old" left, we need to understand what attitudes green voters have towards the welfare state.

Our research also adds to the literature on green parties and their support base. Green parties are often considered a "cultural force" that mobilizes support mainly on the basis of cultural conflicts and concern for the environment. More recently they have been portrayed as one of the poles of the globalisation cleavage (Bornschier, 2018; Kriesi et al., 2008), mobilizing a cosmopolitan voter group of "globalisation winners" (Dolezal, 2010). While our research builds on this research, we show that green voters also clearly have distinct distributive preferences which have important implications

for welfare state politics. These findings support evidence that the boundaries between the two dimensions that structure political competition in Europe have become blurred (Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015).

Further research is needed to fully understand the implications of the realignment on the left for the politics of social policies in the 21st century. First, our analysis tells us very little why green voters have the preferences that they do and lacking good measures of salience in the ESS, we know very little about the electoral relevance of the welfare state for voters of the new left. Second, our study does not delve into cross-national differences. We know very little how the restructuring of the political space depends on the different strategic choices of different actors, and how this impact the politics of the welfare state. Both the socio-demographic composition of green voters and their distributive attitudes might vary across Europe, for instance depending on the age of the green party, on the electoral strength or the programmatic orientation of the social democratic party, or on the composition of the government. Finally, further research is needed to analyze whether and how green parties represent the distributive interests of their voters when they are in government. A first study shows that government participation of green parties indeed increases spending on social investment policies (Röth and Schwander, 2020) but more work is needed to understand the precise mechanisms and conditions of green responsiveness to their voters' welfare state preferences.

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Supplementary Information/Appendices

The Distributive Preferences of Green Voters in Times of Electoral Realignment

Table of Contents

A List of dependent variables

1. LEFT-RIGHT PLACEMENT
LRSCALE: 'In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?' Answer categories: 0 left - 10 right

2. REDISTRIBUTION
GINCDIF: 'The government should take measures to reduce differences in income level.' Answers categories: 1 agree strongly - 5 disagree strongly

3. SOCIAL CONSUMPTION
GVSLVOL: 'People have different views on what the responsibilities of governments should or should not be. For each of the tasks I read out please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much responsibility you think governments should have. 0 means it should not be governments' responsibility at all and 10 means it should be entirely governments' responsibility. Firstly to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old.'
Answer categories: 0 not all to 10 entirely

4. SOCIAL INVESTMENT
RKPRBF: 'Would you be against or in favour of the government introducing extra social benefits and services to make it easier for working parents to combine work and family life even if it means much higher taxes for all?'
Answer categories: 1 strongly against - strongly in favour

5. TRADE-OFF: SOCIAL CONSUMPTION VS. INVESTMENT
DUUNMP: 'Now imagine there is a fixed amount of money that can be spent on tackling unemployment. Would you be against or in favour of the government spending more on education and training programs for the unemployed at the cost of reducing unemployment benefit?'
Answer categories: 1 strongly against - 4 strongly in favour

6. WELFARE STATE CHAUVINISM
IMSCLBN: 'Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here? Please choose the option on this card that comes closest to your view.'
Answer categories: 1 immediately on arrival; 2 after a year, whether or not have worked; 3 after worked and paid taxes at least a year; 5 once they have become a citizen; 5 they should never get the same rights

7. EU SOCIAL PROTECTION

EUSCLBF: 'It has been proposed that there should be a European Union-wide social benefit scheme for all poor people. In a moment I will ask you to tell me whether you are against or in favour of this scheme. First, look at the highlighted box at the top of this card, which shows the main features of the scheme. A European Union-wide social benefit scheme includes all of the following: - The purpose is to guarantee a minimum standard of living for all poor people in the European Union. - The level of social benefit people receive will be adjusted to reflect the cost of living in their country. - The scheme would require richer European Union countries to pay more into such a scheme than poorer European Union countries. Overall, would you be against or in favour of having such a European Union-wide social benefit scheme?'
Answer categories: 1 strongly against - 4 strongly in favour

8. BASIC INCOME

BASINC: 'Some countries are currently talking about introducing a basic income scheme. In a moment I will ask you to tell me whether you are against or in favour of this scheme. First, I will give you some more details... A basic income scheme includes all of the following [main features]:

- The government pays everyone a monthly income to cover essential living costs.

- It replaces many other social benefits.

- The purpose is to guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living.

- Everyone receives the same amount regardless of whether or not they are working.

- People also keep the money they earn from work or other sources.

- This scheme is paid for by taxes.

Would you be against or in favour of having this scheme in [country]?'
Answer categories: 1 strongly against - 4 strongly in favour

B   Additional information about the data

Table A.1: List of Green parties by country

Country	Name	Other voters	Greens voters	Total
AT	The Greens – The Green Alternative	1,238	193	1,431
BE	Agalev – Green; Ecolo	1,187	148	1,335
CH	Greens	823	84	907
DE	Alliance 90 / Greens	1,790	195	1,985
FI	Green League	1,288	194	1,482
FR	The Greens	1,113	128	1,241
GB	Green Party	1,424	39	1,463
IE	Green Party	1,839	30	1,869
IS	Green-Left Movement; Pirate Party	483	219	702
NL	GreenLeft	1,234	70	1,304
NO	Green Party	928	24	952
SE	Green Party	1,218	101	1,319 9

Source: ESS Round 8, ParlGov Database 2019

Note: The table shows the number of green voters compared to all other voters in the ESS by country.

Table A.2: Number of respondents by party family

	Freq.	Percent
Far/socialist left	958	6
Social democrats	3,953	25
Greens	1,39 4	9
Christian-Democrats	2,727	17
Liberals	1,435	9
Conservatives	2,735	17
Right populists	1,397	9
others	1,391	9
Total	15,990	100

Source: ESS Round 8, ParlGov Database 2019

Table A.3: Summary statistics of key variables

	count	mean	sd	min	max
Left-right placement	8430	5.008066	2.105629	0	10
Redistribution	8618	3.753423	1.037144	1	6
Social consumption	8621	7.890036	1.696309	0	11
Social investment	8605	2.621964	.8130194	1	5
Trade-off	8606	2.835347	.7677164	1	5
Welfare state chauvinism	8595	3.034904	1.038671	1	5
EU social protection	7012	2.55405	.8693349	1	5
UBI	8607	2.467294	.9197742	1	5
Party choice	8623	.8626928	1.11533	0	3
Age	8623	44.11655	12.65949	15	87
Gender	8623	.4731532	.4993077	0	1
Education4	8623	2.801345	1.082789	0	4
Income	8623	6.239708	2.637706	1	10
Children	8623	.4643396	.4987556	0	1
Urban	8623	.6323785	.4821855	0	1
Unemployed	8623	.0622753	.2416689	0	1
Union	8623	.3803781	.4855079	0	1
Public	8623	.3213499	.4670219	0	1
N	8623				

C Descriptive differences in social policy preferences across voter groups

C.1 Green voters vs. all other voters

The graphs below compare the distribution of responses to all the dependent variables for green voters and all other voters.

Figure A.1: Left-right placement and preferences towards redistribution among green voters vs. all other voters

(a) Left-right placement   (b) Redistribution

Figure A.2: Support for social investment and consumption among green vs. all other voters

(a) Social consumption

(b) Social investment

(c) Trade-off

Figure A.3: Support for access to the welfare state among green vs. all other voters

(a) Welfare state chauvinism

(b) EU social protection

(c) Universal basic income

C.2 Green voters vs. social democratic voters

The graphs below compare the distribution of responses to all the dependent variables for green voters and social democratic voters.

Figure A.4: Left-right placement and preferences towards redistribution among green voters vs. social democratic voters

(a) Left-right placement   (b) Redistribution

Figure A.5: Support for social investment and consumption among green vs. social democratic voters

(a) Social consumption

(b) Social investment

(c) Trade-off

A9

Figure A.6: Support for welfare state access among among green voters vs. social democratic voters

(a) Welfare state chauvinism

(b) EU social protection

(c) Universal basic income

D   Predicted probability plots illustrating key effects

Figure A.7: Predicted probability of left-wing attitudes by partisanship

Figure A.8: Predicted probability of support for social investment and consumption by partisanship

Figure A.9: Predicted probability of support for access to the welfare state partisan-ship

E Results with a more detailed variable for party choice

Table A.4: Differences in economic attitudes among different voting groups (ordered logit regressions; detailed party families)

	(1) left-right	(2) redistribution	(3) left-right	(4) redistribution
party choice (ref.: greens)				
. other	1.689***	−0.454***	1.484***	−0.390**
	(9.05)	(−4.35)	(9.53)	(−2.92)
. radical left	−0.478	0.591**	−0.510	0.442
	(−1.14)	(2.87)	(−1.31)	(1.96)
. social democrats	0.329*	−0.0487	0.321*	−0.131
	(2.02)	(−1.09)	(2.03)	(−1.71)
. conservatives	2.629***	−0.908***	2.529***	−1.016***
	(14.97)	(−6.66)	(15.52)	(−5.36)
. liberals	2.151***	−1.026***	2.022***	−0.992***
	(8.51)	(−7.04)	(7.70)	(−8.15)
. right populists	2.871***	−0.471**	2.917***	−0.614***
	(7.81)	(−3.28)	(8.12)	(−3.50)
age			0.00341	0.0122***
			(1.36)	(3.44)
female (1 = yes)			−0.264***	0.207***
			(−6.81)	(4.30)
education			−0.0797*	−0.0732**
			(−2.43)	(−3.12)
income			0.0508**	−0.116***
			(3.13)	(−12.56)
children (1 = yes)			0.0745	0.0233
			(1.58)	(0.80)
urban area (1 = yes)			−0.108*	0.0231
			(−1.97)	(0.40)
unemployed (1 = yes)			−0.189	0.201
			(−1.66)	(1.84)
union member (1 = yes)			−0.177**	0.296***
			(−3.25)	(5.61)
public sector (1 = yes)			−0.213***	0.162***
			(−5.87)	(4.50)
Observations	15493	15878	8430	8589
AIC	59810.2	41066.0	31924.0	21995.2
BIC	59894.3	41135.1	32001.4	22072.8

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5: Differences in support for social consumption vs. investment mong different voting groups (ordered logit regression; detailed party families)

	(1) consumption	(2) investment	(3) trade-off	(4) consumption	(5) investment	(6) trade-off
party choice (ref.: greens)						
. other	−0.0230	−0.312***	0.195**	−0.0649	−0.321***	0.194*
	(−0.21)	(−9.87)	(3.01)	(−0.73)	(−3.82)	(2.39)
. radical left	0.416***	−0.0180	−0.134	0.322***	−0.0857	−0.114
	(5.47)	(−0.12)	(−1.28)	(4.67)	(−0.55)	(−1.46)
. social democrats	0.137*	−0.170***	−0.0580	0.0557	−0.256***	−0.0569
	(1.97)	(−3.49)	(−0.96)	(0.73)	(−4.11)	(−0.68)
. conservatives	−0.263**	−0.488***	0.286***	−0.330***	−0.574***	0.230***
	(−2.95)	(−5.78)	(4.53)	(−4.13)	(−5.69)	(3.42)
. liberals	−0.339***	−0.368***	0.154*	−0.275***	−0.390***	0.104
	(−6.89)	(−6.99)	(2.47)	(−5.73)	(−4.25)	(1.20)
. right populists	0.383*	−0.662***	0.00191	0.266	−0.682***	−0.0146
	(2.39)	(−8.37)	(0.02)	(1.76)	(−5.21)	(−0.25)
age				−0.00115	−0.00588*	−0.0114***
				(−0.52)	(−2.33)	(−4.50)
female (1 = yes)				0.170**	−0.00446	−0.0487
				(2.67)	(−0.10)	(−0.91)
education				−0.127***	0.00969	−0.0118
				(−6.95)	(0.27)	(−0.34)
income				−0.0510***	−0.00625	0.0549***
				(−4.22)	(−0.42)	(4.62)
children (1 = yes)				0.0425	0.180***	0.0409
				(1.00)	(4.30)	(0.90)
urban area (1 = yes)				−0.00442	0.0555	0.00925
				(−0.08)	(0.94)	(0.31)
unemployed (1 = yes)				−0.145	0.0915	−0.445***
				(−1.56)	(0.66)	(−3.96)
union member (1 = yes)				0.158***	0.134*	−0.0553
				(3.30)	(2.26)	(−0.86)
public sector (1 = yes)				0.0301	0.101	0.0593
				(0.54)	(1.38)	(1.12)
Observations	15954	15326	15443	8615	8364	8425
AIC	56924.9	32495.6	32182.8	30152.5	17635.5	17134.7
BIC	57009.4	32556.7	32244.0	30230.2	17712.8	17212.2

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.6: Differences in support for universalism vs. particularism among different voting groups (ordered logit regressions; detailed party families)

	(1) w.s. chauvinism	(2) eu social protection	(3) basic income	(4) w.s. chauvinism	(5) eu social protection	(6) basic income
party choice (ref.: greens)						
. other	0.707***	−0.611***	−0.531***	0.551***	−0.538***	−0.447***
	(6.15)	(−8.90)	(−4.75)	(4.09)	(−4.81)	(−3.77)
. radical left	0.339	−0.241	−0.115	0.146	−0.266	−0.162
	(1.91)	(−1.39)	(−0.54)	(0.72)	(−1.10)	(−0.66)
. social democrats	0.520***	−0.330**	−0.528***	0.323***	−0.371**	−0.508***
	(4.47)	(−3.09)	(−6.88)	(3.48)	(−2.71)	(−5.22)
. conservatives	0.971***	−0.939***	−1.009***	0.828***	−0.897***	−0.917***
	(9.22)	(−15.66)	(−14.15)	(11.32)	(−9.79)	(−8.70)
. liberals	0.750***	−0.902***	−0.930***	0.638***	−0.895***	−0.868***
	(6.43)	(−6.88)	(−8.79)	(10.55)	(−5.69)	(−5.63)
. right populists	1.280***	−1.058***	−0.963***	1.105***	−1.089***	−0.973***
	(8.95)	(−7.07)	(−8.85)	(8.21)	(−7.45)	(−6.09)
age				0.00436	0.00248	−0.00470*
				(1.29)	(0.61)	(−2.01)
female (1 = yes)				−0.114**	0.105*	−0.0523
				(−2.81)	(2.33)	(−1.06)
education				−0.129***	−0.00347	0.0495
				(−4.91)	(−0.08)	(1.62)
income				0.00295	−0.0279	−0.0608***
				(0.33)	(−1.28)	(−3.95)
children (1 = yes)				0.0896**	−0.0819	−0.0763**
				(2.79)	(−1.90)	(−2.74)
urban area (1 = yes)				−0.234***	0.0458	0.138**
				(−3.84)	(0.68)	(3.01)
unemployed (1 = yes)				−0.0401	0.348*	0.257
				(−0.50)	(2.29)	(1.96)
union member (1 = yes)				−0.0204	0.113*	0.0506
				(−0.33)	(2.27)	(0.74)
public sector (1 = yes)				−0.00805	0.209**	0.118*
				(−0.14)	(2.94)	(2.30)
Observations	14840	12862	15294	8070	6835	8389
AIC	35028.3	28577.4	35890.0	19335.2	15176.5	19708.8
BIC	35089.1	28637.1	35951.1	19412.1	15231.2	19786.2

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

F Analyses of country-differences

F.1 Jackknife regressions

Table A.7: Differences in economic attitudes among left-wing voters based on jackknife regressions

	(1) left-right	(2) redistribution	(3) left-right	(4) redistribution
party choice (ref.: greens)				
. other	2.363***	−0.920***	2.233***	−0.961***
	(14.02)	(−6.38)	(14.27)	(−6.08)
. radical left	−0.485	0.431	−0.529	0.264
	(−1.13)	(1.63)	(−1.29)	(1.00)
. social democrats	0.258	−0.209	0.195	−0.267
	(1.52)	(−1.72)	(1.09)	(−2.19)
age			0.00278	0.0106**
			(1.12)	(3.16)
female (1 = yes)			−0.274***	0.205**
			(−7.36)	(4.22)
education			−0.107*	−0.0838**
			(−2.70)	(−3.53)
income			0.0500*	−0.127***
			(2.57)	(−11.70)
children (1 = yes)			0.0935	0.0216
			(1.48)	(0.61)
urban area (1 = yes)			−0.0491	−0.00912
			(−0.64)	(−0.13)
unemployed (1 = yes)			−0.0917	0.209
			(−0.85)	(1.78)
union member (1 = yes)			0.0960	0.319**
			(0.93)	(3.44)
public sector (1 = yes)			−0.217***	0.120*
			(−5.11)	(2.51)
Observations	15493	15878	8430	8589
AIC	60612.4	41495.8	32521.1	22253.1
BIC	60696.5	41549.6	32598.5	22330.8

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.8: Differences in support for social consumption vs. investment among left-wing voters based on jackknife regressions

	(1) consumption	(2) investment	(3) trade-off	(4) consumption	(5) investment	(6) trade-off
party choice (ref.: greens)						
. other	−0.274	−0.423∗∗	0.366∗∗	−0.282∗	−0.462∗∗∗	0.351∗∗∗
	(−1.55)	(−4.26)	(4.20)	(−2.81)	(−5.36)	(4.46)
. radical left	0.278	0.0570	0.0873	0.168	0.0214	0.146
	(1.35)	(0.44)	(0.38)	(1.16)	(0.14)	(0.72)
. social democrats	−0.0469	−0.126	0.0270	−0.107	−0.147	0.0657
	(−0.24)	(−1.99)	(0.32)	(−0.67)	(−1.96)	(0.54)
age				−0.00180	−0.00435	−0.00990∗∗
				(−0.62)	(−1.85)	(−3.20)
female (1 = yes)				0.147∗	−0.00362	−0.0374
				(2.59)	(−0.08)	(−0.66)
education				−0.133∗∗∗	0.0273	0.0220
				(−6.19)	(0.69)	(0.54)
income				−0.0657∗∗	−0.0126	0.0387∗
				(−4.43)	(−0.61)	(2.25)
children (1 = yes)				0.0600	0.183∗∗	0.0966
				(1.01)	(3.71)	(1.80)
urban area (1 = yes)				0.0935	0.0573	0.0271
				(0.95)	(0.87)	(0.42)
unemployed (1 = yes)				−0.124	0.0108	−0.390∗
				(−1.17)	(0.07)	(−2.53)
union member (1 = yes)				0.498∗∗	−0.0412	−0.0345
				(3.72)	(−0.39)	(−0.24)
public sector (1 = yes)				−0.0363	0.0893	0.0759
				(−0.50)	(1.08)	(1.34)
Observations	15954	15326	15443	8615	8364	8425
AIC	58012.5	32971.3	32748.2	30654.1	17955.9	17493.7
BIC	58097.0	33017.1	32794.1	30731.8	18033.2	17571.1

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.9: Differences in support for universalism vs. particularism among left-wing voters based on jackknife regressions

	(1) w.s. chauvinism	(2) eu social protection	(3) basic income	(4) w.s. chauvinism	(5) eu social protection	(6) basic income
party choice (ref.: greens)						
. other	0.952***	−0.803**	−0.866***	0.796***	−0.776***	−0.782***
	(10.40)	(−5.00)	(−8.61)	(10.91)	(−5.29)	(−6.38)
. radical left	0.350*	−0.0666	−0.0795	0.155	−0.0956	−0.147
	(2.35)	(−0.33)	(−0.39)	(0.74)	(−0.39)	(−0.67)
. social democrats	0.548***	−0.345*	−0.569***	0.325*	−0.327	−0.558***
	(5.05)	(−2.80)	(−5.70)	(2.92)	(−2.07)	(−5.00)
age				0.00356	0.00293	−0.00456
				(0.91)	(0.66)	(−1.70)
female (1 = yes)				−0.101	0.101*	−0.0248
				(−1.81)	(2.45)	(−0.42)
education				−0.141***	0.0376	0.0621
				(−4.71)	(0.81)	(1.87)
income				0.00841	−0.0399	−0.0633*
				(0.47)	(−1.32)	(−3.07)
children (1 = yes)				0.0438	−0.0460	−0.0649
				(0.95)	(−0.93)	(−1.59)
urban area (1 = yes)				−0.234**	−0.0290	0.108
				(−3.71)	(−0.30)	(1.33)
unemployed (1 = yes)				0.0649	0.361*	0.418**
				(0.48)	(2.54)	(3.39)
union member (1 = yes)				−0.0613	0.0320	−0.00297
				(−0.38)	(0.34)	(−0.02)
public sector (1 = yes)				0.0108	0.192*	0.114
				(0.15)	(2.48)	(1.92)
Observations	14840	12862	15294	8070	6835	8389
AIC	35597.1	28999.9	36543.7	19742.3	15388.7	20117.0
BIC	35642.8	29044.7	36589.6	19819.2	15443.3	20194.4

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

F.2 Multi-level regressions

Table A.10: Differences in economic attitudes among left-wing voters (multi-level regressions)

	(1) left-right	(2) redistribution	(3) left-right	(4) redistribution
party choice (ref.: greens)				
. other	2.426***	−0.797***	2.291***	−0.858***
	(44.17)	(−14.53)	(33.03)	(−12.37)
. radical left	−0.467***	0.584***	−0.505***	0.421***
	(−5.87)	(7.15)	(−4.90)	(3.96)
. social democrats	0.297***	−0.0511	0.265***	−0.133
	(5.28)	(−0.86)	(3.67)	(−1.73)
age			0.00386*	0.0112***
			(2.44)	(6.84)
female (1 = yes)			−0.280***	0.207***
			(−7.01)	(4.99)
education			−0.109***	−0.0824***
			(−5.43)	(−4.00)
income			0.0559***	−0.123***
			(6.56)	(−13.76)
children (1 = yes)			0.0789*	0.0208
			(1.97)	(0.50)
urban area (1 = yes)			−0.0908*	0.00176
			(−2.15)	(0.04)
unemployed (1 = yes)			−0.157	0.215*
			(−1.82)	(2.43)
union member (1 = yes)			−0.171***	0.315***
			(−3.61)	(6.50)
public sector (1 = yes)			−0.213***	0.156***
			(−4.73)	(3.33)
var(country)	0.0715*	0.0832*	0.109*	0.0728*
	(2.38)	(2.34)	(2.35)	(2.27)
Observations	15493	15878	8430	8589
AIC	60249.1	41241.5	32275.2	22132.9
BIC	60356.2	41302.9	32437.1	22252.9

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table A.11: Differences in support for social consumption vs. investment among left-wing voters (multi-level regressions)

	(1) consumption	(2) investment	(3) trade-off	(4) consumption	(5) investment	(6) trade-off
party choice (ref.: greens)						
. other	−0.146∗∗	−0.469∗∗∗	0.213∗∗∗	−0.196∗∗	−0.513∗∗∗	0.173∗
	(−2.85)	(−8.17)	(3.67)	(−3.02)	(−7.14)	(2.35)
. radical left	0.423∗∗∗	−0.0206	−0.139	0.315∗∗	−0.0789	−0.109
	(5.50)	(−0.24)	(−1.61)	(3.15)	(−0.71)	(−0.97)
. social democrats	0.132∗	−0.163∗∗	−0.0565	0.0436	−0.238∗∗	−0.0492
	(2.34)	(−2.60)	(−0.89)	(0.60)	(−2.97)	(−0.60)
age				−0.00186	−0.00598∗∗∗	−0.0110∗∗∗
				(−1.18)	(−3.50)	(−6.22)
female (1 = yes)				0.162∗∗∗	0.00204	−0.0435
				(4.08)	(0.05)	(−0.97)
education				−0.143∗∗∗	0.0201	−0.00441
				(−7.25)	(0.93)	(−0.20)
income				−0.0560∗∗∗	−0.00746	0.0555∗∗∗
				(−6.60)	(−0.80)	(5.80)
children (1 = yes)				0.0425	0.178∗∗∗	0.0427
				(1.07)	(4.08)	(0.95)
urban area (1 = yes)				−0.0155	0.0538	0.0119
				(−0.37)	(1.18)	(0.25)
unemployed (1 = yes)				−0.120	0.0817	−0.452∗∗∗
				(−1.42)	(0.88)	(−4.86)
union member (1 = yes)				0.180∗∗∗	0.127∗	−0.0575
				(3.85)	(2.49)	(−1.10)
public sector (1 = yes)				0.0231	0.103∗	0.0601
				(0.52)	(2.09)	(1.19)
var(country)	0.254∗	0.0930∗	0.133∗	0.237∗	0.111∗	0.167∗
	(2.42)	(2.38)	(2.39)	(2.38)	(2.35)	(2.36)
Observations	15954	15326	15443	8615	8364	8425
AIC	57154.3	32572.5	32259.7	30300.4	17712.1	17206.2
BIC	57261.7	32626.0	32313.2	30462.8	17824.6	17318.9

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.12: Differences in support for universalism vs. particularism among left-wing voters (multi-level regressiond d)

	(1) w.s. chauvinism	(2) eu social protection	(3) basic income	(4) w.s. chauvinism	(5) eu social protection	(6) basic income
party choice (ref.: greens)						
. other	0.942***	−0.903***	−0.919***	0.788***	−0.861***	−0.839***
	(16.34)	(−13.62)	(−16.01)	(11.02)	(−10.39)	(−11.75)
. radical left	0.345***	−0.247**	−0.117	0.146	−0.263*	−0.164
	(4.06)	(−2.61)	(−1.38)	(1.33)	(−2.15)	(−1.52)
. social democrats	0.510***	−0.324***	−0.517***	0.306***	−0.354***	−0.491***
	(8.14)	(−4.57)	(−8.32)	(3.87)	(−3.92)	(−6.24)
age				0.00439**	0.00226	−0.00503**
				(2.59)	(1.18)	(−3.03)
female (1 = yes)				−0.123**	0.115*	−0.0424
				(−2.86)	(2.42)	(−1.01)
education				−0.143***	0.00883	0.0554**
				(−6.72)	(0.37)	(2.65)
income				0.00343	−0.0300**	−0.0631***
				(0.38)	(−2.94)	(−7.03)
children (1 = yes)				0.0899*	−0.0831	−0.0772
				(2.08)	(−1.73)	(−1.83)
urban area (1 = yes)				−0.234***	0.0353	0.125**
				(−5.16)	(0.71)	(2.83)
unemployed (1 = yes)				−0.0264	0.340***	0.258**
				(−0.29)	(3.47)	(2.87)
union member (1 = yes)				−0.0215	0.113*	0.0530
				(−0.42)	(2.03)	(1.07)
public sector (1 = yes)				−0.0118	0.209***	0.120*
				(−0.24)	(3.84)	(2.53)
var(country)	0.130*	0.112*	0.148*	0.171*	0.102*	0.157*
	(2.39)	(2.07)	(2.40)	(2.37)	(2.01)	(2.37)
Observations	14840	12862	15294	8070	6835	8389
AIC	35154.8	28651.5	36014.0	19433.5	15254.2	19810.8
BIC	35208.0	28703.8	36067.5	19545.4	15363.5	19923.3

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

G Analyses with cultural attitudes as additional independent variables

Table A.13: Differences in economic attitudes among left-wing voters with additional cultural control variables

	(1) left-right	(2) redistribution
party choice (ref.: greens)		
. other	2.073***	−0.774***
	(14.30)	(−5.31)
. radical left	−0.600	0.458
	(−1.65)	(1.95)
. social democrats	0.150	−0.0691
	(1.04)	(−0.82)
pro gay rights	0.165***	−0.141***
	(8.77)	(−5.14)
pro immigration	−0.167***	0.0406**
	(−8.16)	(2.92)
age	0.00246	0.0126***
	(0.96)	(3.62)
female (1 = yes)	−0.247***	0.177***
	(−8.00)	(3.72)
education	−0.00326	−0.121***
	(−0.08)	(−5.47)
income	0.0665***	−0.126***
	(4.15)	(−14.01)
children (1 = yes)	0.0413	0.0357
	(0.73)	(1.10)
urban area (1 = yes)	−0.0382	−0.0223
	(−0.63)	(−0.30)
unemployed (1 = yes)	−0.206	0.208
	(−1.67)	(1.80)
union member (1 = yes)	−0.194***	0.319***
	(−3.44)	(6.07)
public sector (1 = yes)	−0.193***	0.157***
	(−4.87)	(3.95)
Observations	8284	8426
AIC	31263.2	21558.2
BIC	31340.5	21635.6

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table A.14: Differences in support for social consumption vs. investment among left-wing voters with additional cultural control variables

	(1) consumption	(2) investment	(3) trade-off
party choice (ref.: greens)			
. other	−0.136*	−0.391***	0.196**
	(−2.18)	(−4.26)	(3.00)
. radical left	0.315***	−0.0377	−0.113
	(4.55)	(−0.28)	(−1.34)
. social democrats	0.0819	−0.201***	−0.0339
	(0.95)	(−3.48)	(−0.38)
pro gay rights	−0.115*	−0.0384	−0.0241
	(−2.34)	(−0.84)	(−0.58)
pro immigration	0.0157	0.103***	0.00667
	(1.11)	(7.95)	(0.49)
age	−0.00140	−0.00502	−0.0105***
	(−0.60)	(−1.90)	(−4.40)
female (1 = yes)	0.132*	−0.0195	−0.0605
	(2.19)	(−0.37)	(−1.11)
education	−0.159***	−0.0409	−0.00999
	(−8.73)	(−1.39)	(−0.29)
income	−0.0556***	−0.0116	0.0561***
	(−4.75)	(−0.76)	(4.24)
children (1 = yes)	0.0467	0.199***	0.0344
	(1.09)	(4.38)	(0.71)
urban area (1 = yes)	−0.0351	0.0344	0.0198
	(−0.57)	(0.56)	(0.66)
unemployed (1 = yes)	−0.111	0.0534	−0.402**
	(−1.26)	(0.39)	(−3.14)
union member (1 = yes)	0.170***	0.148**	−0.0583
	(3.76)	(2.65)	(−0.92)
public sector (1 = yes)	0.0380	0.0814	0.0621
	(0.68)	(1.14)	(1.15)
Observations	8445	8218	8276
AIC	29588.7	17167.6	16756.2
BIC	29666.2	17244.8	16833.4

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.15: Differences in support for universalism vs. particularism among left-wing voters with additional cultural control variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	w.s. chauvinism	eu social protection	basic income
party choice (ref.: greens)			
. other	0.567***	−0.622***	−0.731***
	(7.63)	(−8.67)	(−5.96)
. radical left	0.102	−0.168	−0.140
	(0.65)	(−0.78)	(−0.58)
. social democrats	0.221**	−0.240	−0.457***
	(2.75)	(−1.85)	(−4.31)
pro gay rights	0.0797	−0.0852	−0.00935
	(1.52)	(−1.29)	(−0.19)
pro immigration	−0.170***	0.167***	0.102***
	(−16.50)	(8.11)	(7.79)
age	0.00391	0.00376	−0.00484*
	(1.11)	(0.93)	(−2.12)
female (1 = yes)	−0.0911*	0.0982*	−0.0478
	(−2.14)	(2.01)	(−1.10)
education	−0.0496*	−0.0853*	−0.00464
	(−2.09)	(−2.50)	(−0.16)
income	0.0122	−0.0417	−0.0671***
	(1.43)	(−1.78)	(−4.24)
children (1 = yes)	0.0565	−0.0500	−0.0636*
	(1.94)	(−1.44)	(−2.46)
urban area (1 = yes)	−0.193**	0.00618	0.102*
	(−3.12)	(0.09)	(2.14)
unemployed (1 = yes)	−0.0620	0.293	0.194
	(−0.64)	(1.79)	(1.60)
union member (1 = yes)	−0.0316	0.119*	0.0684
	(−0.55)	(2.35)	(1.04)
public sector (1 = yes)	0.000586	0.195**	0.107*
	(0.01)	(2.78)	(1.96)
Observations	7929	6712	8246
AIC	18725.5	14669.1	19260.9
BIC	18802.2	14723.6	19338.1

t statistics in parentheses; cutpoints omitted

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$